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Abstract 
By cognitive radio, the low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites may prefer to operate in the unlicensed spectrum which is open to all 
the users, and compete for the limited resources with terrestrial cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The competition can be re-
garded as a game and analyzed with game theory. This particular unlicensed spectrum sharing problem is modeled here, and the 
special properties of “spatially-distinguished-interference” and the short period of the interactions between satellites and terres-
trial CRNs are explored. Then, the problem is formulated as a “partially-blind” finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma by game 
theory. Finally, we begin with two promising spectrum sharing schemes, which can be used to enforce the frequency reuse 
among the remotely located terrestrial CRN players as well as to overcome the observation noise. By analysis and comparison, it 
is proposed that the novel refreshing-contrite-tit-for-tat (R-CTFT) is the optimal spectrum sharing scheme. Simulation results 
verify that it can be used to utilize the spectrum most efficiently. 
Keywords: satellite communication systems; cognitive radio; unlicensed spectrum sharing; spatially-distinguished-interference; 
finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma; partially-blind; refreshing-contrite-tit-for-tat 
1.  Introduction 1 
The large communication satellite constellations 
such as Iridium and Globalstar have been providing 
communication services for years. They are con-
structed of tens of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites and 
assigned with an exclusive communication spectrum 
band all over the world. However, it is hard to assign 
such a worldwide exclusive band to a small satellite 
constellation since spectrum is a scarce resource. 
Moreover, as suggested in the tactical satellite program, 
the small constellation or the single LEO satellite de-
signed for small-scale and short-lived events should be 
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available over the places of interest with responsive 
launch. Therefore, it is very important for us to adopt a 
more flexible spectrum assignment scheme. 
Cognitive radio (CR) [1] is an emerging technology 
that can utilize the existing spectrum more efficiently 
with dynamic spectrum access (DSA). By cognitive 
radio, each LEO satellite can observe the available 
spectrum bands, learn how to use them, and eventually 
occupy some of them. However, terrestrial cognitive 
radio networks (CRNs) are developing very fast for 
commercial applications [2], so the satellites have to 
share the available spectrum with them. Therefore, the 
LEO satellites with CR technology and the users in 
CRNs belong to different authorities, have different 
goals, and thus will compete for the limited spectrum 
resources. Furthermore, the small LEO satellite con-
stellation may prefer to operate and compete with the 
terrestrial CRN users in the unlicensed spectrum, such 
as the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band, Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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because these bands are open to all the users. 
Game theory is a mathematical tool used to analyze 
the strategic interactions among multiple decision 
makers. It is quite desirable to study CRNs in a game 
theoretic framework when centralized control is not 
available or flexible self-organized approaches are 
necessary [3]. The unlicensed spectrum sharing problem 
can be modeled as a repeated game because of the 
long-term interactions among the players. A repeated 
game is composed of several stages, and each of them 
is a repetition of the same strategic-form game. The 
number of the stages can be finite or infinite.  
Therefore, we analyze the unlicensed spectrum shar-
ing game between LEO satellites and terrestrial CRNs 
with game theory, and provide a solution to the effi-
cient allocation as well. The solution can provide the 
extra spectrum resources so that the LEO satellite can 
keep communicating even in the crowded spectrum. 
This will improve the reliability of the LEO satellite 
communication system. Furthermore, we will explain 
in Section 2 that the environmental variation will not 
degrade the performance seriously. 
Some previous works have been devoted to the unli-
censed spectrum sharing game. In Ref. [4], the achiev-
able rate in the game was obtained with the assumption 
that the game is infinitely repeated and the Gaussian 
interference channels (GICs) are time-invariant. The 
strategy suggested to all the players was Grim-trigger. 
This work was extended to prevent the players from 
cheating with the “punish-and-forgive” strategy [5]. 
With this strategy, the game stays in cooperation stage 
until the opponent defects. Then the game jumps into 
the punishment for the next T1 time slots and coop-
eration resumes from the Tth time slot. For an N-player 
infinite game [6], a strategy based on carrot-and-stick 
strategy was also designed. With the strategy the coop-
eration only recovers when all the players defect. Fur-
thermore, the access probability was introduced to af-
fect the players’ utility in Ref. [7]. 
Although these unlicensed spectrum sharing 
schemes have improved the spectrum usage efficiency, 
they can only be applied to the particular infinitely 
repeated games in which any player in the game has 
mutual interference with anyone else. Furthermore, 
these schemes cannot overcome the observation noise. 
However, for the unlicensed spectrum sharing problem 
between LEO satellites and terrestrial CRNs, the re-
peated game is quite different: the number of the stages 
is finite and the interference among the players is “spa-
tially-distinguished”. And we will take into account the 
observation noise as well. Therefore, this new problem 
should be modeled and formulated, and the corre-
sponding spectrum sharing scheme should be devel-
oped. 
There are many recent developments in the research 
of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma [8-13] , which seems to 
be similar to the game formulated in Section 3 for our 
problem, i.e., the “partially-blind” (PB) finitely re-
peated prisoner’s dilemma. However, the neighbors in 
the spatial game will just need to cooperate, namely 
they do not need to coordinate as the CRN players in a 
PB game to reuse the frequency band. Moreover, the 
LEO satellites in the PB game can move fast by a 
pre-selected route while the other players are almost 
fixed in most cases. Therefore, we need to develop the 
new method to solve this problem. 
2.  System Model 
As we focus on the small LEO satellite constellation, 
the LEO satellites cannot cover any particular area all 
the time. That is to say, for our problem, the main dif-
ference between the small constellation and the single 
LEO satellite is the duration of the gaps between 
passes. Therefore, it is reasonable to reduce the small 
constellation to a single LEO satellite for a simpler 
system model. As a result, we consider a situation 
where one single LEO satellite coexists with the terres-
trial CRN users in the same area and competes for the 
same unlicensed spectrum band. We assume that the 
band is totally 2W as shown in Fig. 1. An LEO satellite 
BS1 passes by the area where two terrestrial CRN us-
ers BS2 and BS3 exist. The satellite can interfere with 
the two users. However, none of the two terrestrial 
CRN users can interfere with the other one or sense the 
other’s existence in many practical cases since the sig-
nals can be deeply attenuated within a short range. It is 
because of the slow fading and fast fading caused by 
the obstacles between transmitters and receivers such 
as buildings, mountains, etc. We call this property “spa-
tially-distinguished-interference” (SDI) which will lead 
to low spectrum efficiency. From Fig. 1 we can see that 
BS2 and BS3 occupy different bands without any co-
ordination. Then, BS1 will definitely interfere with the 
terrestrial CRN users whichever band it chooses. This 
spectrum allocation is quite inefficient since BS2 could 
have reused the frequency with BS3 which is remotely 
located. Therefore the inefficient frequency reuse due 
to SDI causes the inefficient spectrum sharing. 
 
Fig. 1  Model of unlicensed spectrum sharing game between 
LEO satellites and terrestrial CRNs. 
Furthermore, the LEO satellite exists in this area 
only for a short period because it moves at very high 
speed. This period is typically of 10 min with an orbital 
height of 1 000 km and an elevation of 5°. The short 
interaction period will lead to a finitely repeated game 
and possibly a bad equilibrium of the game in the end.  
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We assume that the CR users share the same band by 
piece-wise constant power allocation. For example, if a 
CR user has sensed that there are M1 users to inter-
fere with, it will choose to occupy multiples of 1/M of 
the band. This assumption is reasonable since each 
player can be aware of the number of the competitors. 
Each player would be willing to broadcast its existence 
if there is an efficient equilibrium to arrive at. The fur-
ther explanation can be found in Section 4. 
Finally, we assume that the channels are flat fading 
with Gaussian interference. It is reasonable to assume 
that the channels are flat fading because the propaga-
tion of the radio between satellites and terrestrial CRN 
users is line-of-sight in most cases. We also assume 
that the users use random Gaussian codebook to 
achieve the channel capacity, and thus each user can 
treat the received interference as white noise [4]. 
We model a situation in which each system is 
formed by a single transmitter-receiver pair. Each pair 
could be called a user here. For an M-user flat fading 
Gaussian interference channel in discrete time, the re-
ceived signal of user i at time n is 
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where yi is the received signal of user i, hj,i the chan-
nel gain from user j to user i, xj the transmitted signal 
or interference from user j, and the noise process is 
independently identical distributed over time with the 
zero mean Gaussian distributed random variables zi. M 
is the number of all the users, which should be greater 
than one. 
Under these assumptions, we can determine the 
maximum rate that user i can achieve over specific 
power allocations (Ri , b/s) as 
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where cj,i = |hj,i|2, which represents the channel 
power gain from player j to i. N0 is the noise density, 
and the power spectral density of the transmitted signal 
of user i, pi( f ), is restricted by the maximum transmit-
ted power Pti: 
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According to SDI, for BS1-BS3 in Fig. 1 we can as-
sume ci,i = 1, c1,2 = c2,1 = c1,3 = c3,1 = 1/4, c2,3 = c3,2 = 0, 
W = 1 (2W in total) , N0 = 1, Pt1 = Pt2 = Pt3 = P.  
We also assume that the power is uniformly distrib-
uted, i.e., pi( f ) = P for player i occupying W and   
pi( f ) = P/2 for 2W. 
This model will be extended without loss of general-
ity in Section 3 to the case of one satellite and two 
pairs of terrestrial CRN players sharing the spectrum.  
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the environ-
mental variation will not degrade the scheme perform-
ance seriously, because the environment does not 
change frequently. The CRN base stations are practi-
cally assumed to work permanently in most cases. Fur-
thermore, the terrestrial CRN users covered by the sat-
ellite do not change rapidly as the satellite moves, since 
the area covered is very large. For example, a typical 
LEO satellite, such as the satellite in Iridium, is 780 km 
high and has each beam more than 600 km in diameter. 
Thus, we assume the smallest beam and the following 
results can be obtained. 
The velocity of the satellite v is about 7.45 km/s, and 
the velocity of the projection on the ground vp is about 
6.65 km/s. Therefore, as the satellite moves, the vary-
ing rate of the covered area A/t is about 1 995 km2/s, 
namely 0.7% of the whole area per second. 
One of the worst cases is that the CRN base stations 
are uniformly distributed, such that the change is sus-
tained. Thus, we can assume that the base stations are 
uniformly distributed and the following results can be 
obtained. 
The time required for the environment to vary for 
10% is about 14 s. 
However, this time can be much larger in practice 
since most of the terrestrial CRN users gather in cities 
or towns [2]. And, the change will affect the equilibrium 
of the spectrum sharing game only if the satellite enters 
the cities or towns. When the satellite leaves, the inter-
ference decreases, and the satellite does not need to 
change its channel. 
Therefore, this channel variation will not degrade 
the performance seriously since the services provided 
by small LEO satellite constellations are mainly burst 
transmissions, which are non-real-time and last only 
for several seconds to several tens of seconds. 
3.  Problem Formulation 
In this section, we formulate the problem as a special 
game. We assume that all the players are rational. In 
other words, players would try to selfishly maximize 
their own interest, but they would not be malicious. We 
first prove that the single stage spectrum sharing game 
with SDI is actually a prisoner’s dilemma. Then, we 
attribute the multi-stage game to the finitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma due to the short interaction period. 
Finally, considering the effect of SDI on the observa-
tion, we formulate the problem as a PB finitely re-
peated prisoner’s dilemma. 
3.1.  Single stage game 
In a single stage game, all the players only care 
about their current payoffs. The set of strategies 
( * * * *1 2, , , , ,i Ks s s s  ) is called a Nash equilibrium 
[14] if 
and only if for all possible strategies, the strategy utili-
ties always satisfy:  
 * * * * * * *1 2 1 2( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , )i i K i i KU s s s s U s s s s	     (4) 
The Nash equilibrium provides a stable point from 
which no individual would have any incentive to deviate. 
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For the spectrum sharing game, the critical issue is 
to make an agreement on how to share the spectrum 
among the players. The specific channel allocation will 
be easily implemented if all the players have reached 
such an agreement. With the agreement, each player 
will just take its share and occupy the corresponding 
vacant spectrum. 
In our model, the players in Fig. 1 have the available 
strategies of occupying either only one band (W) or all 
the two bands (2W). Occupying more bands can bring 
higher capacity, but it will also introduce more inter-
ference at the same time. We prove that the single stage 
game with SDI is actually a prisoner’s dilemma [14]. 
Deduction 1  With the assumptions in Section 2, 
we formulate the single stage problem with three pri-
mary components: 
1) Set of players: N = {BS1, BS2, BS3}. 
2) Strategy space: S = {W, 2W}. 
3) Payoff utility function: Ui = 2 Ri (i = 1, 2, 3), 
where 
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The capacity Ri could be replaced by its monotonic 
increasing function Ui for simplicity. 
The capacities approximate the upper bounds as the 
power P approaches infinity. Therefore, we can get the 
utility bounds of all the strategy sets. For example, if 
the strategies are {W, W, 2W}, satellite BS1 will avoid 
interfering with BS2 but have to interfere with BS3. 
We can calculate the utility bound of BS3: 
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Therefore, we can calculate all the payoff utility 
bounds according to the system model, and use two 
2-player game matrices in Fig. 2 to represent the game 
of three players (P  ). 
 
Fig. 2  The 3-player game model with SDI. 
The Nash equilibrium of this game is the 
non-cooperative strategy set {2W, 2W, 2W} with the 
utility set {9, 25, 25}. This stable outcome is inefficient 
for all the players. However, the Pareto optimal strat-
egy set is {W, W, W}. Therefore, this single stage game 
can be attributed to the prisoner’s dilemma [14]. 
3.2.  Finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
Different from the rational players in an infinitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, those in a finitely re-
peated prisoner’s dilemma have no incentive to coop-
erate in any single stage. This result can be inferred 
from the backward induction [15]. 
In a finitely repeated game, there is an end in the 
game. At the final stage, each rational player will cer-
tainly spread its power over all the 2W band since de-
fecting dominates cooperating when there is no future 
payoff. Then in the next to the last stage, defecting 
does better than cooperating again because the choice 
at this stage cannot affect the outcome at the final stage. 
Thus, defecting will also be adopted by the players in 
the third stage from the end. As a result, the players 
will defect in each stage. 
3.3.  PB game 
In normal games, we assume that players can observe 
the other players’ strategies. However, in Fig. 1 either 
BS2 or BS3 cannot observe the other’s strategies be-
cause of SDI. Furthermore, the satellite will enter the 
game without any information in advance if the satel-
lite does not broadcast its entrance, so the terrestrial 
CRN players cannot observe the satellite’s entrance. 
Therefore we call it the PB observation. 
The PB observation can be further illustrated in Fig. 3, 
which can be regarded as an extension of the model in 
Fig. 1. There are four pairs of people and an additional 
person talking in Fig. 3. Pairs A, B and pairs C, D are 
separated by a soundproofing wall, and E is at the end 
of the wall. Suppose that people can avoid interference 
only by talking in a different tone. When E is not talk-
ing, people at the same side can cooperate by equally 
dividing the available tones. However, when E sud-
denly starts to talk, any pair cannot tell whether it is the 
other pair’s defecting at their side or E’s entrance. In 
the first case the interference will definitely lead to the 
deviation from the cooperation, but in the second case 
the players could establish a new cooperation state 
with E. Moreover, the two pairs at each side should 
reuse the same tones so as to leave some free tones for 
E if the players would like to communicate without any 
interference to achieve larger capacities. The frequency 
reuse may lead to some coordination overhead, and we 
need to design a scheme to avoid the overhead as much 
as possible. 
 
Fig. 3  PB observation model. 
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Therefore, this problem is formulated as a PB 
finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. 
4.  Spectrum Sharing Schemes 
In this section, we propose the optimal spectrum 
sharing scheme refreshing-contrite-tit-for-tat (R-CTFT) 
for the game. This scheme contains the strategies that 
are based on tit-for-tat (TFT). Tit-for-tat is an English 
saying meaning “equivalent retaliation”. The strategy 
TFT includes the following four items:  
1) Unless provoked, the player will always cooper-
ate. 
2) If provoked, the player will retaliate. 
3) The player is quick to forgive. 
4) The competition continues long enough for re-
peated punishment and forgiveness. 
TFT was designed for the finitely repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma in the game theory, whereas 
grim-trigger [4] was designed for the infinite one. TFT 
can be viewed as an improved version of grim-trigger 
because grim-trigger only has the first and second 
items in the list. And TFT is more practical since there 
is not any infinite game in the real world. 
TFT is a strikingly simple and quite natural strategy, 
but it emerged as the most efficient strategy for the 
finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma [15]. The dilemma 
will be self-enforced to an efficient equilibrium [15] if 
some players in the game take this strategy. Then all 
the players will take TFT strategy and cooperate with 
the others at this equilibrium. 
One of the possible processes is described as follows 
with which the terrestrial CRN players (without any 
satellite) can arrive at the efficient equilibrium and 
share the unlicensed spectrum efficiently: 
We first assume that each terrestrial CRN base sta-
tion possesses an identification (ID) number to con-
struct a network. The ID numbers can be related to 
some reputation information. It is proposed that each 
CRN player would be willing to broadcast its ID num-
ber since there is an efficient equilibrium to arrive at. 
On the other hand, each CRN player would be willing 
to take TFT in order to cooperate with the other known 
competitors because most terrestrial CRN base stations 
are supposed to keep working for a period that is long 
enough to meet the fourth item in the requirement list 
of TFT, and the efficient equilibrium is beneficial to all 
the players. With this process, the base stations with 
good reputations can cooperate with the others once 
they begin to work. 
However, things are different when it comes to the 
unlicensed spectrum sharing game between LEO satel-
lites and terrestrial CRN users. Firstly, LEO satellites 
may not be willing to broadcast their ID numbers since 
most of them are intended for some special use such as 
the military use. Secondly, terrestrial CRN players may 
not be willing to cooperate with LEO satellites since 
the period of the interaction between them is so short 
that it may not meet the fourth item in the requirement 
list of TFT. Thirdly, they cannot arrive at the efficient 
equilibrium even if the satellites broadcast their ID 
numbers and the terrestrial CRN players are willing to 
cooperate. This is because the frequency cannot be 
efficiently reused due to SDI and the corresponding PB 
observation. Although the PB observation can be over-
come by the coordination among satellites and terres-
trial CRN users, the overheads will severely degrade 
the performance of the LEO satellites. 
Therefore, it is a crucial problem to enforce the effi-
cient unlicensed spectrum sharing between LEO satel-
lites and terrestrial CRN users without a specific ID 
number and overcome the PB observation without any 
coordination overhead as well. 
Moreover, TFT is an efficient strategy, but the per-
formance can be easily lowered by the observation 
noise. Contrite-tit-for-tat (CTFT) and generous-tit- 
for-tat (GTFT) are the most efficient general versions of 
TFT that can be used to cope with the observation 
noise in the game theory [16]. Therefore, we should also 
take the observation noise into consideration in our 
game. 
We first design the scheme refreshing-tit-for-tat 
(R-TFT) which can help enforce the efficient spectrum 
sharing under the noiseless PB observation. This 
scheme can help enforce the efficient frequency reuse 
to overcome the PB observation without any satellite 
ID number or coordination overhead. In R-TFT, the 
“refreshing” process is added before the efficient equi-
librium is approached. Furthermore, in order to over-
come the observation noise, we suggest two promising 
spectrum sharing schemes refreshing-generous-tit- 
for-tat (R-GTFT) and R-CTFT which are based on 
GTFT and CTFT. Finally, we prove that R-CTFT 
dominates R-GTFT with noisy PB observation in our 
game. Therefore we propose that R-CTFT is the opti-
mal scheme for our problem. 
4.1.  Noiseless PB observation 
The establishment of the efficient equilibrium car-
ried out by R-TFT can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 4, 
which is later named as the “refreshing” process. The 
satellite player first spreads its power all over the unli-
censed spectrum since its entrance (Figs. 4(a)-4(b)). It 
keeps spreading until the previous cooperation state 
breaks (Fig. 4(c)). Then it begins to cooperate and 
broadcast its entrance in order to setup a new coopera-
tion state (Figs. 4(d)-4(e)). On the other hand, the ter-
restrial CRN players just take the normal strategy (TFT 
here) (Fig. 4). They regard the satellite entrance as 
some other terrestrial CRN players’ defection because 
they have no prior knowledge about it. Thus they de-
fect in Fig. 4(c), and will return to cooperation after the 
satellite cooperates and broadcasts its entrance (Fig. 
4(e)). 
Here an ID number is not necessary for the satellite 
to broadcast its entrance. This is because the ID num-
bers are used to convey some reputation information 
before the player enters the game. But the satellite has 
built up a good reputation immediately by its behavior 
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after cooperating regardless of the others’ actions. 
Therefore, the satellite BS1 can successfully enforce 
the frequency reuse by “refreshing” the cooperation  
 
Fig. 4  Efficient equilibrium carried out by R-TFT. 
state and finally share the unlicensed spectrum effi-
ciently without any coordination overhead. The terres-
trial CRN players also benefit from this scheme since 
the sooner they set up the new cooperation state, the 
less interference from the satellite they will receive. 
After the establishment of the efficient equilibrium, all 
the players can just take the normal strategies (TFT 
here) to maintain the cooperation. Therefore the 
scheme R-TFT is an efficient and stable solution to the 
efficient spectrum sharing under the PB observation. 
4.2.  Noisy PB observation 
GTFT and CTFT are the general versions of TFT, 
which can be used to cope with the observation noise 
most efficiently [16]. 
GTFT is the same strategy as TFT except that it al-
lows the player to forgive the opponent with a prob-
ability even if it is provoked.   
CTFT has three states, i.e., content, provoked and 
contrite. 
1) Content: the player begins in content with coop-
eration and stays there unless there is a unilateral de-
fection. 
2) Provoked: if the player is the victim while the 
content state is broken, it becomes provoked and de-
fects until cooperation from other players causes it to 
become content. 
3) Contrite: if it is the defector while the content 
state is broken, it becomes contrite and cooperates. 
This strategy is based on the idea that one should not 
be provoked by the other player’s response to one’s 
own unintended defection. It can be figured out 
whether the defection was unintended or not just by 
watching the outcome, i.e., the payoff utility.  
The simulation in Ref. [16] shows that GTFT is better 
than CTFT at lower noise levels, but when the noise is 
greater than 1%, CTFT is better.  
We propose two schemes, R-GTFT and R-CTFT, to 
enforce the frequency reuse under the noisy PB obser-
vation. The strategies in the schemes are mainly based 
on GTFT and CTFT. In R-GTFT and R-CTFT, the 
same “refreshing” process is added as in R-TFT before 
the efficient equilibrium is approached. After the estab-
lishment of the efficient equilibrium, all the players can 
just take the normal strategies (GTFT or CTFT here) to 
maintain the cooperation. 
We first prove that R-CTFT is more efficient than 
R-GTFT for the terrestrial CRN players. Next, we 
show that the satellite players also prefer R-CTFT. 
Thus, R-CTFT is the optimal scheme for our problem. 
Deduction 2  We assume that for the terrestrial 
CRN players, the opponent, namely the other player in 
the pair in Fig. 3, has the perfect observation. That is to 
say the terrestrial CRN opponent has no observation 
noise.  
From Fig. 2 we can see that the single stage game is 
a prisoner’s dilemma for all the players, even if there is 
a satellite that has already entered the game. However, 
the game is different when there is a satellite entering 
the game. In the “refreshing” process, the satellite will 
keep spreading its power over the whole spectrum until 
the previous cooperation state breaks. Then, before all 
the players’ defecting, the game is not a prisoner’s di-
lemma. In this game, defecting dominates cooperating, 
and it is optimal for all the players to defect. Thus, they 
would like to defect as quickly as possible. 
Therefore, the exact number of the players will not 
affect the results of the games, namely either all de-
fecting or all cooperating. We can simplify the games 
by separating the players into two groups that will 
choose to cooperate or defect. Each player could 
choose to join either group at each game stage.  
Moreover, we can simplify the games by replacing 
the exact utility values with some values that can rep-
resent the characteristics more clearly. The prisoner’s 
dilemma can be represented by the left matrix in Fig. 5, 
and the other game can be represented by the right ma-
trix. 
 
Fig. 5  Utility table. 
We also have 
1) False observation probability: p. 
2) Forgiving probability in R-GTFT: q. 
3) Opponent’s false observation probability: 0. 
4) Satellite entering probability: e. 
The state transition diagram of the spectrum sharing 
game can be shown in Fig. 6, where Pi stands for the   
 
Fig. 6  State transition diagram of the spectrum sharing 
game. 
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probability of the state Si, Pi,j the probability of the 
transition from Si to Sj. In most practical situations, the 
terrestrial CRN players are cooperating when the satel-
lite enters. Thus we reduce the transitions between S2 
and S3 for simplicity. Define the states: 
1) Opponent cooperating without entrance: S1. 
2) Opponent defecting without entrance: S2. 
3) Satellite entering: S3. 
Calculate the steady state probabilities: 
 
1 111 21 31
2 12 22 2
13 333 3
0
0
P PP P P
P P P P
P PP P
    
        
        
 (6) 
The mean utility can be calculated as 
1 1 2 2 3 3Mean Mean( ) Mean( ) Mean( )S P S P S P    (7) 
In R-GTFT, we have the transition probabilities: 
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21 33
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 (8) 
The mean values of the state utilities are 
1
2
3
Mean( ) (1 ){3[(1 ) ] 5 (1 )} 0
Mean( ) (1 )(1 ) 0 [(1 ) ]
Mean( ) 4[(1 ) ] (1 )(1 )
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S p q p q p
S p q p p q
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(9) 
While in R-CTFT, the transitions are more predict-
able. The terrestrial CRN players have three states, 
namely content, provoked and contrite. In the pro-
voked or the contrite state, the players will keep de-
fecting or cooperating until the state transits. Therefore, 
the transition probabilities in R-CTFT are 
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22 33
21 31
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
1
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P e p
P e
P P p
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 (10) 
The mean values of the state utilities are 
 
1
2
3
Mean( ) (1 )[3(1 ) 5 ] 0
Mean( ) 0 (1 )
Mean( ) 4 (1 )
S e p p e
S p p
S p p
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 (11) 
Thus, we can plot the utility curves of R-GTFT and 
R-CTFT given a certain false observation probability 
in Figs. 7-8. When there is no satellite entering, the 
performance of R-GTFT can be improved by increas-
ing the forgiving probability. In that case, R-GTFT can 
perform better than R-CTFT as shown in Fig. 7. How-
ever when the satellite entering probability is nonzero, 
increasing the utilities in state S1 and S2 of R-GTFT by 
increasing the forgiving probability comes at the price 
of decreasing the utility in state S3, and vice versa. It 
means that the performance of R-GTFT is limited by 
the trade-off between the non-satellite state utility and 
the satellite entering state utility. This trade-off curve is 
represented by the utility curve of R-GTFT in Fig. 8. 
The trade-off curve shows that the utility curve of 
R-GTFT is bounded and cannot be higher than that of 
R-CTFT. Therefore, R-CTFT is strictly better than 
R-GTFT for the terrestrial CRN players. 
 
Fig. 7  Utility curves without satellite entrance (e = 0) with 
the false observation probability 0.01. 
 
Fig. 8  Utility curves with satellite entrance (e = 0.05) with 
the false observation probability 0.01. 
On the other hand, the satellite players will also pre-
fer R-CTFT. We can setup the new cooperation sate in 
a more efficient way by R-CTFT rather than R-GTFT, 
since the probability of the transition from S3 to S1 is 
larger in R-CTFT. Moreover, after the establishment of 
the new cooperation state, the satellite can be regarded 
as a terrestrial CRN player and it will also prefer 
R-CTFT. 
Therefore, R-CTFT is proposed as the optimal spec-
trum sharing scheme for our game. This scheme can be 
viewed as the equilibrium, from which no player would 
like to deviate, and the players in R-CTFT can share 
the spectrum efficiently and stably. 
5.  Simulation Results 
In this section, we conduct numerical simulations to 
evaluate the proposed spectrum sharing schemes. The 
· 612 · XIE Zhuochen et al. / Chinese Journal of Aeronautics 25(2012) 605-614 No.4 
 
payoff utilities corresponding to the strategies are the 
same as shown in Fig. 5. But the state transitions are 
not the same as shown in Fig. 6. The transitions be-
tween S2 and S3 are included here for more accurate 
results. 
We first look into the problem with the noiseless PB 
observation. There are two terrestrial CRN players and 
one satellite player in the game. We assume that the 
players are taking R-TFT scheme. Figure 9 shows a 
terrestrial CRN player’s payoffs. The variation of the 
payoffs reflects the interactions among the players. The 
satellite enters when the payoff falls down to 4, 
whereas the cooperation state is successfully “re-
freshed” when the payoff grows back to 3. Therefore, 
according to the simulation, R-TFT can be used to deal 
with the noiseless PB observation and enforce the fre-
quency reuse among the terrestrial CRN players. 
 
Fig. 9  Illustration of R-TFT with noiseless PB observation. 
Then, we take into consideration the observation 
noise. The effect of the observation noise on R-TFT is, 
however, shown in Fig. 10. The payoff will swing be-
tween peaks and valleys after the false observation. 
And the game may converge to a less efficient equilib-
rium which has a payoff of 1 instead of 3. 
 
Fig. 10  Illustration of R-TFT with noisy PB observation. 
Therefore, we design two schemes, R-GTFT and 
R-CTFT, which are based on the most efficient 
anti-noise strategies. Figures 11-12 show the payoffs of 
R-GTFT and R-CTFT with the noisy PB observation. 
The swing due to the noisy observation is removed in 
these schemes. It means that these schemes are suc-
cessful in coping with the noise.  
 
Fig. 11  Illustration of R-GTFT with noisy PB observation. 
 
Fig. 12  Illustration of R-CTFT with noisy PB observation. 
Next, we compare these two schemes for the terres-
trial CRN players with a certain noise level and satel-
lite entering probability. Figure 13 shows the payoffs 
without any satellite entrance, whereas Fig. 14 shows 
the payoffs with a nonzero satellite entering probability. 
The payoffs of R-GTFT can be higher than those of 
R-CTFT with a large forgiving probability when there 
is no satellite entrance. However, the performance of 
R-GTFT is restricted when there is a satellite entering 
the game at some time. In Fig. 14, R-GTFT is domi-
nated by R-CTFT and the performance of R-GTFT 
cannot be improved by increasing the forgiving prob-
ability.  
 
Fig. 13  Comparison for terrestrial CRN players without 
satellite entrance. 
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Fig. 14  Comparison for terrestrial CRN players with satel-
lite entrance. 
We also conduct simulations for spectrum sharing 
with different noise levels (i.e., different false observa-
tion probabilites) and satellite entering probabilities to 
further explore the performance of R-GTFT and 
R-CTFT. It can be shown in Figs. 15-16 that R-CTFT 
dominates R-GTFT with different false observation 
probabilities or satellite entering probabilities.  
 
Fig. 15  Comparison for terrestrial CRN players with dif-
ferent false observation probabilities. 
 
Fig. 16  Comparison for terrestrial CRN players with dif-
ferent satellite entering probabilities. 
Finally, we verify that R-CTFT is better for the sat-
ellite players as well. In Fig. 17, R-CTFT is faster than 
R-GTFT in the “refreshing” process of the cooperation 
state whatever the observation noise is. After the estab-
lishment of the new cooperation state, the satellite will 
evaluate the strategy in the same way as the terrestrial 
CRN players. Therefore, both the terrestrial CRN play-
ers and the satellite players prefer R-CTFT, and they 
will not deviate from the scheme. By R-CTFT, all the 
players in the game can share the unlicensed spectrum 
efficiently and stably. 
 
Fig. 17  Comparison for satellite players with different false 
observation probabilities. 
6.  Conclusions 
We have proposed a novel spectrum sharing scheme 
to stably improve the efficiency of the unlicensed spec-
trum sharing game between LEO satellites and terres-
trial CRN players. We model the problem, explore two 
special properties of the problem and formulate the 
problem as a PB finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. 
Then, we propose that R-CTFT is the optimal spectrum 
sharing scheme for the game. This scheme can be used 
to enforce the frequency reuse among the remotely 
located terrestrial CRN players without any coordina-
tion overhead as well as to overcome the observation 
noise. Simulation results verify that the proposed 
scheme has stably improved the spectrum usage in the 
most efficient way. 
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